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WOMEN AS OUTSIDERS:
GROWING
DIVERSITY
PUBLIC OPINION

A
IN

Cal Clark, Auburn University
Janet Clark, West Georgia College
Women may be regarded as outsiders in American politics for
several intersecting reasons. First, and perhaps most obviously, they
remain woefully underrepresented among the political elites in the
United States . Even after the "Year of the Woman" in the 1992
national elections, for example, women held only about a tenth of the
seats in Congress -- one of the lowest rates among advanced industrial
societies -- and a fifth in the state legislatures (Cook et al, 1994; Darcy
et. al. , 1987). Second, at least until the 1980s, women participated in
mass political activities (e.g., voting) at somewhat lower rates than
men did (Baxter and Lansing, 1980; Clark and Clark, 1986; Welch,
1977). These two indicators of being "outside the central polity," in
tum, were explained by a more fundamental third factor -- gender role
socialization that oriented women to passive and home-oriented
activities. Social trends during the 1970s and 1980s altered this picture
somewhat The rise of the women's movement and women's increasing
entrance into the workforce eroded many barriers that traditional values
and socialization patterns had created (Elshtain, 1981; Klein, 1984;
Sapiro, 1983; Sinclair, 1983). As a result, gender differences in mass
political participation narrowed greatly; and the number of women in
office increased gradually but, in cumulative terms, quite impressively
(Baxter and Lansing, 1980; Darcy et al, 1987).
The attenuation of the first three facets of women's status as
political outsiders was accompanied, perhaps paradoxically, by the
growth of a fourth aspect. This was the "gender gap" that emerged for
the first time in voting and issue attitudes during the 1980s.
Previously, there had been little difference in the political preferences of
men and women on most substantive issues. Following the election of
Ronald Reagan, women began to take more liberal positions on a wide
variety of issues and to vote in a more liberal manner than men
(Bendyna and Lake, 1994; Clark and Clark, 1993 & 1994; Kenski,
1988; Mueller, 1988; Poole and Zeigler, 1985; Stoper, 1989). The
conventional explanation for this was that, as they became more aware
of political life, women began to apply distinctively feminine values,
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such as compassion and a stress on interpersonal relations, to the
political sphere in what might be termed a rise in "gender
consciousness" (Carroll, 1982; Conover, 1988; Gilligan, 1982; Klein,
1984; Rinehart, 1992). The growing prominence of the gender gap,
however, diverted attention from the fact that the gap between
traditional women and feminists was growing as well, as denoted by the
surprising lack of a gender gap on abortion and the Equal Rights
Amendment (Sears and Ruddie, 1990; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986),
suggesting that both groups of women might be considered as
outsiders.
Thus, by the early 1990s, public opinion data provided several
pieces of evidence that women remained outsiders in U.S. politics and
that several disparate groups might qualify for this rubric. With public
opinion data from the 1992 National Election Survey conducted by the
University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research, this paper tests
the hypothesis that women are still outsiders. We begin by examining
the gender gap on alienation from the political system, general
ideological positions, and a sampling of issues concerning women -- all
of which would be expected to manifest feelings of women as outsiders.
The absence of a gender gap on a central woman's issue, abortion, is
then explored in more detail to suggest a more nuanced portrayal of
women as outsiders. Finally, the initial findings are refined by
comparisons of several groups of women who would be expected to
hold differing political perspectives. Overall, the image of women as
political outsiders is confirmed; and several separate types of
"outsidedness" emerge from the analysis.

The Gender Gap on Alienation,
Issues

Ideology,

and Women's

If women are truly outsiders in the American polity, one would
expect them to be disproportionately alienated from their government,
liberal in a time of conservative (Reagan-Bush) administrations, and
sensitive to issues concerning women's socioeconomic and political
status. Data on all these dimensions are presented in Tables I through
5 where the gender gap is the simple difference between the percentage
of women and men holding a particular attitude. A positive gender gap
shows that women are more likely to state a belief than men, while a
negative one indicates that an idea is more prevalent among men.
Several aspects of the data on political alienation are consistent
with the women as outsiders hypothesis, but overall the results lend
only partial support to this theory. Except for expressing a general
patriotism, women appeared quite disgruntled. They did not believe that
the U.S. was going in the right direction or that the economy was
improving; they were quite cynical about the government's competence,
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honesty, and responsiveness; they did not appear particularly active or
efficacious in political life; and less than half trusted people in general .
In short, taken by themselves, they had all the characteristics of
political outsiders. Yet, these data are far from completely supportive
of the women as outsiders hypothesis which presumes that they are
disadvantaged relative to men. If this were so, women should be
significantly more alienated than men. In direct contrast, except for the
efficacy items (where a negative gap of 10% to 15% shows that
women's gains in mass participation have yet to translate into full
equality in participatory attitudes), the gender gap is fairly marginal.
Thus, women's political alienation does not appear to be much different
from men's.
The gender gap is generally consistent with the image of women as
outsiders for almost all the items concerning ideology (Tables 2, 3, and
4). Table 2 presents the results of a "feeling thermometer" with a scale
of Oto I 00 (50 indicates neutral feelings) that respondents were asked to
apply to individuals and groups. It reports the percentage of the
population that had positive feelings toward a political figure or group,
as indicated by giving them a score of 60 or above. Perhaps the most
striking aspect of these data is that few of these groups are perceived
positively by as little as half the population. Again, as with the
alienation data, Americans clearly were in a sour mood in November
1992.
Table 2 shows that in 1992 women felt more positively toward
Bill Clinton, liberals, the federal government and Congress,
environmentalists, the poor and welfare recipients, and less positively
toward George Bush and conservatives. As would be expected, women
had more positive feelings than men toward the women's movement
(49% to 38%) and feminists (31% to 27%), although these fairly low
percentages for even women indicate the cleavage between feminists and
traditional women noted above. Women also almost invariably had
similar warmer feelings, in the 5% to 10% range, toward the wide
variety of social groups included in the table. Since most of these
groups are minorities, this finding implies a sympathy toward fellow
outsiders. Finally, in a somewhat similar vein, women were more
appreciative of police and lawyers than men, suggesting that women
may feel more vulnerable as outsiders and, thus, more in need of the
protection offered by these two sources.
The image of women as more liberal than men is confirmed by the
data on general ideological positions in Table 3 and on spending
priorities in Table 4. In terms of ideological and partisan self-image,
women were 8% less likely than men to identify themselves as
Republicans and as conservatives (approximately 37% to 45% each).
Women were more supportive than men (generally in the range of 10%
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Table 1
GENDER GAP IN ALIENATION FROM THE POLITY
Male

Female

Gender
Gap

SatisfactiQn with
CQnditiQns in U.S.
Love U.S.
U.S. going in right direction
National economy better
Personal finances better

90%
20%
6%
34%

88%
15%
4%
27%

-2%
-5%
-2%
-7%

28%
53%
35%
72%
79%
75%

30%
52%
36%
65%
78%
76%

2%
-1%
1%
-7%
-1%
1%

22%
75%

22%
62%

0%
-13%

60%
80%
42%
42%
48%

73%
72%
27%
26%
37%

13%
-8%
-15%
-16%
-11%

49%

42%

Trust Qf GQvemment
Trust govt most of time
Govt doesn't care about people
People have no say in govt
Government wastes money
Govt run for big interests
US Reps good district contacts
Efficacy andActivism
Active in community
Interest in govt & politics
Politics too complex to
understand all the time
Understand political issues
Better informed than most on pols
Can do a good job in office
Well qualified for politics
General Alienation
Trust people

-7%

SOURCE: Computed from the data from the 1992 National Election
Study of the Survey Research Center, distributed by the Interuniversity
Consortium for Political and Social Research . Reprinted with
permission .
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Table 2
GENDER GAP ON FEELING TIIERMOMETERS
(in percentage of scores over 60 on a scale of O - 100)

Male

Female

Gender
Gap

Politicians
George Bush
Bill Clinton
Ross Perot

40%
47%
30%

36%
52%
28%

-4%
5%
-2%

Politi1,;alId~logi~s
Conservatives
Liberals

31%
19%

26%
26%

-5%
7%

Politi1,;alInstitutions
Federal Government
Congress
Military
Police

18%
19%
63%
59%

23%
26%
61%
64%

5%
7%
-2%
5%

Politi1,;alIn~r~sts
Big Business
Unions
Environmentalists
Lawyers

29%
31%
53%
18%

29%
29%
59%
29%

0%
-2%
6%
11%

Wom~n·sQrouus
Feminists
The Women's Movement

27%
38%

31%
49%

4%
11%

Pot~ntial Publi1.;S~rvi~ R~i11i~n1s
Poor
55%
Welfare Recipients
19%

64%
23%

9%
4%
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Table 2 (continued)

Six;ial QrQUQ~
Catholics
Fundamentalists
Jews
Whites
Blacks
Hispanics
Asians
Southerners
Immigrants
Illegal Immigrants
Gays

Male

Female

Gender
Gap

44%
27%
43%
57%
41%
35%
31%
45%
33%
7%
10%

48%
30%
49%
64%
52%
42%
38%
49%
33%
9%
18%

4%
3%
6%
7%
11%
7%
7%
4%
0%
2%
8%

SOURCE: Computed from the data from the 1992 National Election
Study of the Survey Research Center, distributed by the Interuniversity
Consortium for Political and Social Research. Reprinted with
permission.
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Table 3
GENDER GAP ON IDEOLOGICAL ISSUES, 1992

Idoology
Conservative
Republican
Roi~ of Qov~mm~nt
Government should expand
Govt should become more powerful
Strong govt over free market
Govt involved in what people
should do for themselves
Increase services vs. cut spending
Govt provide health insurance
Govt guarantee job and standard
of living
Government provide child care
Willing to pay more taxes
Eguru Rights Commitm~nt
All should have equal rights
Too much emphasis on equal rights
in US
Support govt on school
integration
Domesti~ Viol~nQ~Issu~s
Favor death penalty
Draft avoiders right
Police vs social services to
control urban unrest

Gender
Gap

Male

Female

45%
44%

37%
36%

-8%
-8%

55%
29%
64%

70%
44%
76%

15%
15%
12%

45%
32%
49%

31%
42%
54%

-14%
10%
5%

26%
56%
29%

34%
65%
31%

8%
9%
2%

91%

91%

0%

46%

45%

-1%

40%

50%

10%

86%
47%

71%
55%

-15%
8%

29%

21%

-8%

SOURCE: Computed from the data from the 1992 National Election
Study of the Survey Research Center, distributed by the Interuniversity
Consortium for Political and Social Research. Reprinted with
permission.
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Table 4
GENDER GAP ON FEDERAL SPENDING

Increase social security spending
Increase spending for poor
Increase spending for homeless
Increase child care spending
Increase AIDS spending
Increase public school spending
Increase college aid
Increase spending on unemployed
Increase spending for Blacks
Increase spending for cities
Increase welfare spending
Increase food stamp spending
Increase spending on crime
Increasedefense spending
Increase environmentalspending

Male

Female

41%
48%

55%
61%

68%
44%
61%
62%
59%
35%
23%

77%

21%

13%
15%
67%
20%

59%

56%
63%
69%
61%
44%
27%

21%
21%
21%
73%

19%
63%

Gender
Gap
14%
13%
9%
12%
2%
7%

2%
9%
4%
0%
8%
6%
6%
-1%
4%

SOURCE: Computed from the data from the 1992 National Election
Study of the Survey Research Center, distributed by the Interuniversity
Consortium for Political and Social Research. Reprinted with
permission.
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Table 5
GENDER GAP ON WOMEN'S ISSUES

Male

Female

Gender
Gap

Women equal role in bus
and govt vs. stay at home
Women should form groups vs.
act on own
Sexual harassment serious
problem
Pro- Choice
High interest in women's issues
Pride in women's achievements
Anger at women's treatment

75%

75%

0%

53%

64%

11%

25%
46%
77%
61%
61%

38%
46%
80%
72%
63%

13%
0%
3%
11%
2%

SOURCE: Computed from the data from the 1992 National Election
Study of the Survey Research Center, distributed by the Interuniversity
Consortium for Political and Social Research. Reprinted with
permission.
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to 15%) of expanding the role and powers of government, presumably
because they believed that redistributive policies were necessary to help
them and other marginal groups in society. The data on preferences for
increased spending in Table 4 demonstrate that women were generally
more favorable than men by 5% to 15% toward increased spending in a
wide variety of liberal areas, as well as for fighting crime (again
suggesting their greater concern with protection). Finally (returning
briefly to Table 3), women were more supportive of school integration
and more opposed to "domestic violence" than men, although there was
no gender gap on the subject of "equal rights" at least in the abstract
(90% of Americans expressed a commitment to equal rights, but near
majorities thought that the U.S. was now placing equal emphasis upon
them).
One would certainly expect a considerable gender gap on women's
issues . For example, the "thermometer" data in Table 2 showed that
women felt significantly more positively toward the women's
movement and feminists than did men. The results in Table 5, then,
are somewhat surprising since a significant gender gap emerges on only
three of the seven items -- women were 11% to 13% more likely than
men to say that sexual harassment was a serious problem, that women
should form groups instead of acting individually, and that they felt
pride in women's achievements. On three other items, there was a
surprising consensus of approximately two-thirds to three-quarters of
both men and women who expressed interest in women's issues, anger
at the way that some women were treated, and the belief that women
and men should have an equal role in business and government (as
opposed to staying home). While a cynic might note greater male
commitment to more abstract and symbolic issues, as opposed to the
more concrete issues of feminism and women's organizing to increase
their power, this generally strong support for women's equality is
consistent with long-term secular shifts in American public opinion
toward greater support for equality in gender relationships (Mayer,
1992).

The Abortion Issue: Two Sets of Women Outsiders
Perhaps the most surprising finding in Table 5 is that 46% of both
men and women professed a pro-choice opinion on abortion, generally
viewed as the most central "woman's issue" of the 1980s and 1990s. In
actuality, though, this "non-gender gap" continues a trend dating back
to the 1970s in which the opposition of women with traditional values
to the Equal Rights Amendment and abortion have pulled down
women 's overall level of support for these issues to or even slightly
below that of men (Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986).
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In the 1992 elections, moreover, this effect explained why the
gender gap in the presidential vote was more muted than in the 1980s.
Compared to men, women were 5% more likely to vote for Clinton,
1% less likely to vote for Bush, and 4% less likely to vote for Perot
(Bendyna and Lake, 1994; Pomper et al, 1993). In contrast to 1988
when views on abortion were unassociated with presidential vote
(despite Bush's pro-life and Dukakis' pro-choice positions), Table 6
demonstrates that abortion had a significant impact on the 1992 vote.
For example, Bill Clinton ran 20% better among pro-choice than
among pro-life voters (58% to 38%), while George Bush enjoyed a 25%
advantage among pro-lifers (47% to 22%). Controlling for position on
abortion, Table 7 indicates that this new impact of abortion on
presidential vote did indeed attenuate the observed gender gap for the
population as a whole. As for the electorate as a whole, there is almost
no gender gap for George Bush among either pro-life or pro-choice
voters. However, in both these subgroups women were approximately
10% more likely than men to support Clinton (62% to 52% for prochoice voters and 44% to 33% for pro-life voters) -- approximately
double the gender gap for the population as a whole. Thus, the
increased salience of the abortion issue in 1992 attenuated the gender
gap by diverting the votes of some pro-life women who nonnally
would have voted for Clinton to Bush or Perot and, to a presumably
lesser extent, some pro-choice women to Clinton.
The abortion issue in 1992, therefore, clearly tapped the alienation
from a prime women's issue of women with traditional values. This
argues for a closer examination of what types of women took a pro-life
position. Table 8 presents the crosstabulations, for women respondents
only, between beliefs on abortion and seven potential explanatory
variables: views toward fundamentalists and liberals (as indicated by a
score of 60 or higher on the feeling thermometer), income, education,
age, and whether the respondent was a feminist or a homemaker. Table
9 then presents a multivariate analysis of variance to ascertain the
combined impact of the significant factors on a woman's taking a prolife or pro-choice position, as well as each individual predictor's
independent contribution to the "explained variance" in the dependent
variable.
As would be expected, a positive feeling toward fundamentalists
has a very strong impact on a woman's position on abortion. For
example, 70% of the women who liked fundamentalists were pro-life,
while only 37% of the women who had less positive feelings toward
fundamentalists took a pro-life stance. There were also moderate
tendencies for women who liked liberals, were highly educated, and
came from more affluent families to be more pro-choice than those with
the opposite characteristics. Feminists (self-identified) were 12% more
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Table 6
RELATIONSHIP BE1WEEN VIEWS ON ABORTION
AND 1992PRESIDENTIAL VOTE

Clinton
Bush
Perot
Cramer's V = .26

Pro-life*
38%
47%
15%
Stat1st1cal sig

Pro-choice**
58%
22%
20%

= .001

*Abortion should never be permitted, or only for rape and incest (37%
of Americans) .

**Abonion

should always be permitted (46% of Americans) .

SOURCE: Computed from the data from the 1992 National Election
Study of the Survey Research Center, distributed by the Interuniversity
Consortium for Political and Social Research.
Reprinted with
permission.
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Table 7
GENDER GAP ON VOTING CONTROLLING
FOR POSITION ON ABORTION

PRO-LIFE*

Men
Clinton
Bush
Perot
Cramer's V = .14

33%
48%
20%
Stat1sucal s1g = .002

Women
44%
46%
11%

PRO-CHOICE**

Men
Clinton
Bush
Perot
Cramer's V = .13

52%
22%
26%
Statistical sig = .002

Women
62%
22%
16%

* Abortion should never be permitted, or only for rape and incest (37%
of Americans).
**Abortion should always be permitted (46% of Americans).

SOURCE: Computed from the data from the 1992 National Election
Study of the Survey Research Center, distributed by the Interuniversity
Consortium for Political and Social Research. Reprinted with
permission.
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likely than nonfeminists (63% to 51 %) to be pro-choice. While this
difference is in the expected direction, it is considerably less than might
have been expected, indicating that moral beliefs crosscut those about
women's status. Finally, homemakers and women over 55 were
slightly more pro-life than non-homemakers and younger women. The
analysis of variance shows that in combination these independent
variables have a moderate impact on women's views about abortion in
the United States (the Eta squared of .22 is equivalent to an R2 of .22
and R of .47 in multiple regression). The relative influence of these
predictions is generally consistent with the results in the bivariate
tables -- fundamentalism and education are fairly strong, while
liberalism, feminism, and income are weak but still significant (age and
homemaker status were not significant).
These results imply that the political processes in America in the
early 1990s have created two distinctive sets of women "outsiders." On
the one hand, the changing socioeconomic conditions had made many
women more liberal on a wide variety of issues concerning social
compassion. On the other, the moral beliefs of many women alienated
them from the mainstream of the women's movement with its prochoice philosophy. While many of the women in this second set were
religious fundamentalists and fell into low income and low education
categories, the surprisingly weak correlation between feminism and
support for the pro-choice position certainly indicates that the
stereotype of pro-choice feminism is overdrawn and that the women's
movement may be alienating some potential supporters. For example,
while most feminists have positive feelings toward the women's
movement, as would certainly be expected, almost a quarter (22%) do
not.

Attitude Differences Among Women: Types of Outsiders
The discussion of attitudes about abortion in the previous section
confirms the suggestion that there are at least two distinct groups of
women political outsiders. This section explores the question of
different types of women outsiders more systematically through two
types of data analysis. The first compares the attitudes of several
groups of women, some of whom would be presumed to be liberal and
some conservative, on representative items concerning economic and
women's issues. To the extent that their predicted ideological variations
emerge, our basic hypothesis about women as outsiders should be
supported. In addition, though, some deviations from these predictions
might also be suggestive about distinctive subgroups that merit being
termed outsiders. Second, the width of the gender gap within these
groups will also be examined to test whether several types of presumed
outsiders display the predicted attitude patterns.
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Table 8
RELA TIONSIDPS BE1WEEN ABORTION BELIEFS
AND POSSIBLE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES AMONG WOMEN

POSITIVE VIEW OF FUNDAMENTALISTS
No
Pro-life
Pro-choice

Gamma = -.60

37%
63%
Statistical sig = .001

Yes
70%
30%

FEMINIST
No
Pro-life
Pro-choice

Gamma = .24

49%
51%
Statistical sig = .01

Yes
37%
63%

HOMEMAKER
No
Pro-life
Pro-choice

Gamma= -.20

44%
56%
Statistical sig = .05

Yes
54%
46%

POSITIVE VIEW OF LIBERALS
No
Pro-life
Pro-choice

Gamma= .37

50%
50%
Statistical sig = .001

Yes
31%
68%
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Table 8 (continued)
EDUCATION
Some
High
School
Pro-life
76%
69%
Pro-choice 24%
31%
Gamma= .47 Statistical sig =
G~
School

High
School
51%
49%
.001

Some
College

College

37%
62%

23%
77%

INCOME
$15,000Uncb'
$15,000
$35,000
Pro-life
61%
41%
Pro-choice
39%
59%
Gamma = .36 Statistical sig = .001

$35,000$50,000
43%
57%

Over
$50,000
27%
73%

AGE
Under35
35-55
Pro-life
44%
43%
Pro-choice
56%
57%
Cramer's V = .14 Statistical sig = .001

Over 55
52%
48%

SOURCE: Computed from the data from the 1992 National Election
Study of the Survey Research Center, distributed by the Interuniversity
Consortium for Political and Social Research. Reprinted with
permission.

16 I The Journal of Political Science

Women as Outsiders
Table9
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE EXPLAINING
POSITION ON ABORTION AMONG WOMEN

Eta Squared
Individual Effects

.22
% Explained SS (Variance)

Like fundamentalists
Education
Like liberals
Feminist
Family income

10.5%

TOTAL

22.3%

6.7%
1.9%
1.8%
1.4%

SOURCE: Computed from the data from the 1992 National Election
Study of the Survey Research Center, distributed by the Interuniversity
Consortium for Political and Social Research. Reprinted with
permission.

Eight representative items from Tables 2 through 5 were selected
for this analysis of women's issues -- positive attitude towards women
groups, belief that women should have an equal role in business and
government, and pro-choice views -- and of ideological and economic
issues -- positive feelings toward Bill Clinton, a desire for government
to increase services rather than cut taxes, and support for increasing
spending on the poor, child care, and social security. The views of
different subgroups of women on these eight issues were then compared
to the percentage of all women holding an attitude in Table 10.
The first set of comparisons concerns indicators of a woman's
status and philosophical orientation -- whether or not she was a
feminist, a homemaker, or had a positive view of fundamentalists .
Obviously, the former should have liberal attitudes; and the latter two
conservative ones. Additionally, one would expect that the these
differences to be more marked on women's issues than on economic
ones. A second set concerns ideological orientations or socioeconomic
characteristics closely associated with ideology -- whether a woman
identified herself as a conservative or a liberal and whether she belonged
to a minority group. Such ideological differences should hold over both
economic and women's issues (except, perhaps, for minorities who
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might focus on "bread and butter" concerns). A third comparison
involves social class orientations as indicated by education, a college
degree versus no more than a grade school education (almost exactly the
same figures result from comparing those with family incomes over
$50,000 to those with under $15,000). Here, the attitudinal differences
should be greater on economic than women's issues; in fact, upper class
women might well be expected to be more concerned with women's
issues than working class ones. Our final comparison focuses upon age
cohorts -- women under 35 and over 55. Younger women should be
more liberal on both sets of issues with the possible exception of social
security spending which is obviously of special concern to the elderly.
Our basic hypotheses about ideological differences are essentially
confirmed by the data in Table 10, although several significant and
suggestive exceptions exist. Feminists were quite liberal on the
women's issues (with the exception of their limited liberalism on
abortion discussed previously) and in support of Clinton while only
moderately so on the four directly economic issues . In contrast,
homemakers and fundamentalists were conservative on women's roles
and abortion, quite so in the case of the fundamentalists' rejection of the
pro-choice position. However, they differed little from women in
general in their views on economic issues , Clinton, and even the
women 's movement. These surprising findings have two important
implications . First , being a homemaker no longer seems to reinforce
traditional socialization except in a couple of areas closely linked to a
homemaker's social status and self-respect.
Second, given the
comparatively low socioeconomic status of many fundamentalists (e.g.,
31 % of women who liked fundamentalists had a grade school education
or less, more than double the 14% of those who did not) their moderate
stance on many issues may reflect an awareness of vulnerability which,
in tum, makes them sensitive to the potential benefits of government
assistance and organizing self-help groups.
The predicted differences among liberal, conservative, and minority
women emerge quite well; and, as hypothesized, these variations are
generally high for both economic and women's issues. One interesting
exception to this general rule is that neither liberals nor conservatives
deviate much from the average for all women on social security, an
issue that once was at the core of ideological divisions in the U.S.
Perhaps, this reflects social security's acceptance as an "entitlement" or
"middle class welfare." Likewise, younger women were more liberal
than older ones on almost all these issues as well. This is consistent
with the theory of changing generational socialization, although the fact
that the "age gap" is particularly wide on child care spending and narrow
on social security hints at a bit of generational special interest as well.
The presumption that less educated women would be much more liberal
on the economic issues holds true except for child care spending which
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college graduates want increased more than those with grade school
educations by a significant margin (61% to 51%). This suggests the
special needs of another group of outsiders -- women pursuing
professional careers who do not wish to be shunted off to a "mommy
track" (Clark and Clark, 1994 present data showing that many of these
women fonn a group distinct from feminists). Conversely, college
educated women are much more liberal than grade school educated ones
on women's issues, confinning that education is an important agent of
"countersocialization" (Fowlkes, 1983). Also regarding education, the
association of low education with a prolife position accounts for
minority women having a slightly conservative position on abortion
when a liberal one would be expected (multiple table analysis not
presented in paper).
When one looks at how the gender gap varies among groups of
women , it is also possible to provide a more sophisticated test of the
hypothesis that women are more "compassionate" than by simply
detennining if women in general are more liberal on social issues than
men. In essence, the compassion hypothesis argues that women who
would normally be expected to be conservative will support aiding the
disadvantaged out of compassion . Since poor women would nonnally
be expected to take such a position out of self interest, the problem
arises of how to separate "compassion" from "self interest." If it is
assumed that both men and women who are economically distressed
will take liberal positions on government roles and spending policies,
then one would expect that the gender gap should be significantly wider
among more affluent than less affluent groups . In the fonner instance ,
compassion would pull women away from men's normal attitudes,
while in the latter both men and women would be pulled in the same
direction by self-interest. Similarly, the gender gap should be much
greater among conservatives than liberals since most liberals should be
pro-government, while compassion should pull women away from
conservatives ' anti-government inclinations.
The data in Table 11 strongly support this perspective. As
predicted, the gender gap is much greater for conservatives than for
liberals, for college-educated women than for grade-school educated
ones, and, to a slightly lesser extent, for high-income than for lowincome women. Thus, the compassion often attributed to women 's
gender consciousness (Gilligan , 1982; Rinehart , 1992; Shapiro and
Mahajan, 1986) evidently exists even where it would not particularly be
expected, thus providing much stronger support for this perspective
than could be derived by simply comparing men and women.
Comparing the gender gap between generations can also provide an
interesting test of the conflicting implications of the generational
socialization and countersocialization perspectives. The first argues that
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Table 10
COMPARISONOF ATTITUDESOF SUBGROUPSOF WOMEN
Like
Women
Movmt

Women
F.qual
Role

Pro
Choice

Like
Clinton

More
Govt
Servs

Spend
More
Poor

Spend
More
Child Cr

Spend
More
Soc Sec

All Women

49%

75%

46%

52%

42%

61%

56%

55%

Feminists
Homemakers
Fundaments

78%
49%
57%

85%
65%
63%

55%
39%
26%

70%
47%
51%

49%
40%
35%

69%
61%
60%

67%
52%
54%

56%
54%
58%

Minority
Liberal
Conservative

71%
73%
34%

72%
91%
55%

42%
74%
27%

66%
78%
37%

62%
61%
30%

81%
76%
48%

74%
75%
40%

74%
52%
55%

College
Grade Sch

58%
53%

87%
52%

67%
21%

52%
57%

38%
52%

48%
74%

61%
51%

38%
74%

Under 35
Over 55

54%
43%

84%
63%

50%
40%

52%
53%

51%
30%

63%
57%

71%
39%

57%
51%

SOURCE: Computedfrom the data from the 1992 NationalElection Study of the Survey ResearchCenter, distributedby
the InteruniversityConsortiumfor Political and Social Research. Reprinted with permission.

Table 11
COMPARISON OF GENDER GAPS IN THE ATTITUDES OF SUBGROUPS OF AMERICANS
Like
Women
Movmt

Women
F.qual
Role

Pro
Choice

Like
Clinton

More
Govt
Servs

Spend
More
Poor

Spend
More
Child Cr

Spend
More
Soc Sec

Population

11%

0%

0%

5%

10%

13%

12%

14%

Liberal
Conservatives

7%
13%

-4%
-7%

4%
2%

-3%
18%

3%
12%

6%
21%

4%
16%

8%
18%

College
Grade School

22%
-3%

5%
0%

13%
-12%

9%
-3%

13%
1%

10%
6%

20%
3%

14%
19%

Low Income*
High Income•

2%
6%

-1%
7%

-6%
12%

-7%
6%

12%
7%

13%
10%

6%
16%

10%
11%

Under 35
Over 55

18%
-2%

6%
-2%

1%
5%

7%
1%

16%
0%

8%
9%

21%
4%

15%
9%

*Low income: family income under $15,000.
High income: family income over $50,000.
SOURCE: Computed from the data from the 1992 National Election Study of the Survey Research Center, distributed by
the lnteruniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Reprinted with permission.

Clark and Clark
the vastly changed nature of American society between the 1950s and
1970s means that all younger Americans are receiving different
socialization experiences. If this is true, men as well as women under
35 should be much more liberal than older generations; and there is
little reason to suppose that the gender gap would vary greatly among
generations. In contrast, countersocialization theory would argue that
women have to take special advantage of opportunities for obtaining
countersocialization, such as increased access to higher education and
more liberal cultural norms. Thus, it would predict that the expansion
of these opportunities in the 1970s and 1980s should have created a
comparatively wide gender gap within the younger generation. On this
question, the data in Table 11 are unambiguous as the gender gap is
significantly wider among those under 35 than among those over 55 for
six of the eight items. Thus, the younger generation of educated
women seemingly constitute another group of political outsiders in the
sense that their expectations have clearly outrun the attitudes of their
male peers.
Imp lie a tions
This paper has used the evidence of American public opinion in
1992 to examine the theory that women in the United States can be
regarded as a group of "political outsiders." The raw data on the gender
gap were generally consistent with this analysis. Moreover, a more
detailed probing of women's opinions indicated that there is not just a
single group of outsiders -- well-educated, liberal feminists. Rather
there is a ring of "outsider" groups with interests that both overlap and
crosscut each other --liberal feminists, women pursuing professional
careers who are not necessarily feminists, the new generation of women
college graduates, women with blue and pink collar jobs and many
minority women who respond to traditional liberal "bread and butter"
issues, women with traditional values on such issues as abortion, and
(although their distinct attitudes were not isolated in this analysis)
destitute women.
Contemporary analysis of these differences usually does not go
beyond the conflict between feminists and traditional women. However,
this more complex picture might be advantageous for starting a process
of identifying overlapping interests among some of the subgroups. For
example, many traditional women share financial worries with blue
collar women; professional women and feminists have shared interests
on many women's issues; and so forth. This process could be vital
because, if these groups of outsiders remain disunited and working at
cross purposes, their shared status as outsiders is likely to continue.
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